Junta’s control of Myanmar is seriously threatened with implosion

[reader]

From Pattaya Mail

By Barry Kenyon

Myanmar’s military regime, which came to power in a February 2021 coup, is in serious trouble. The military leader senior general Min Aung Hlaing has admitted that the country could split if his forces are unable to stop an insurrection in the huge and lawless Shan state which borders China, the junta’s largest trading partner. Military spokesman Zaw Min Tun has separately conceded that several northern towns have fallen to the Three Brotherhood Alliance which has overrun dozens of military posts, forced the surrender of hundreds of soldiers and cut off the junta’s access to the 2,000 kilometers of the Chinese border.

Jason Tower, Myanmar program director for a US-funded think tank, said about half the entire countryside was in the hands of insurgent groups which have, for example, cut oil and gas pipelines from the Bay of Bengal to the China border. The junta still controls the main cities, at any rate from the barracks, and has firm control of the capital Naypyitaw and the commercial hub of Yangon. The problem is that the fighting is getting closer to urban centers and even garrisoned towns are under threat.

There is speculation that senior general Myint will be forced to resign, although it is not clear who is successor would be and whether he could be any more effective in countering a civil war. In the south of the country, the Karen National Liberation Army has attacked towns which link Yangon with the Thai border. There are rumors that members of the State Administration Council (as the junta calls itself) have already bought properties in Thailand, to flee to if necessary. Some generals are believed to be in favour of a less incompetent leader who would enter negotiations with the disparate resistance groups. It would be no easy task.

The consequences of Myanmar’s internal chaos are far-reaching for its relations with other countries. Russia and China have both supplied arms to the junta, but China’s support has waned the Myanmar authorities have failed to check the growing number of cyberscam gangs operating in the border regions. Thailand has followed an ambivalent policy towards post-coup Myanmar and the Thai army maintains good relationships with its senior colleagues over the border. The deteriorating security situation means that foreign tourism, which had shown some small signs of picking up in the last 12 months, is again dead on its feet. Unless there is very soon international intervention to steady the political chaos, Myanmar could be on a course for total collapse or ad hoc division into separatist regions.
 

 

[PeterRS]

Fascinating article on a subject that has largely disappeared from the international media and which is far more complex than merely a national junta taking and seeking to keep power. I just wonder about Barry Kenyon's remarks on China. We know that the last thing China wants, barring internal revolution, is trouble on its borders. It needs a degree of stability in Myanmar and that was the reason for its initial considerable support to the army. This is more true because China already had a great deal of activity going on in Myanmar prior to the start of the coup, much of it illegal. A number of US-based websites have suggested that, as Kenyon remarks, support for the military is now waning in favour of supporting both sides in the conflict.

One of China's major concerns is the junta's continuing support - deliberately against China's expressed desire - of forced-labour camps near the border, many with Chinese and Chinese-backed so-called rebels. 

Over the summer, China raised the stakes by giving the Chinese media and film industry a green light to dramatize the chaos in Myanmar with popular films illuminating the fate of Chinese nationals who ended up in one of the thousands of forced-labor scam compounds now lining Myanmar’s borders. The films — “No More Bets,” “Tainted Love” and “Lost in the Stars” — have netted more than $1 billion at the box office, sending the message that Chinese nationals can only be safe in Southeast Asia with China’s help. The reality, of course, is that China deliberately looked the other way while this problem incubated. For over a decade, billions of dollars in illicit Chinese capital fueled the development of gambling enclaves under the pretense of supporting Chinese political and economic aims, while also winning the useful backing of corrupt local elites throughout the region . . .

Beijing began acting unilaterally in September, focusing on two border enclaves that enjoy the highest levels of autonomy from central control, the Wa and Mong La areas in Northern Shan State. Both are controlled by powerful local armies and fall well within China’s sphere of influence. They use Chinese currency, electricity, internet and telecommunications, and in the case of the Wa, Chinese-created banking system. The elites of both areas have been trained largely in China, and many have Chinese national ID cards.

China acted against the Wa and the Mong in an attempt to crack down on the forced labout camps. Both fell into line. But not the national military government. It still holds between 20,000 and 30,000 Chinese in over 100 forced-labour camps in an area the size of Rhode Island. But as often happens, China's influence can be seen as a two-edged sword.

. . . signs of increased Chinese security influence should concern all groups in Myanmar. While the anti-coup movement is united for now in its central aim to remove the military from government, should unity and coordination among the disparate resistance groups break down in the future, it could risk Chinese manipulation, playing one party against another, to assert Chinese national interest over that of Myanmar. This is perhaps one of the strongest incentives for resistance actors to consolidate and expand alliances rapidly, formally adopting agreed political visions.

https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/11/myanmars-junta-losing-control-its-border-china