The Air France Concorde Crash

[PeterRS]

Sunday marks the 21st anniversary of the horrific crash of an Air France supersonic Concorde just after take-off from Paris Charles de Gaulle airport. Not only were all 109 people on the aircraft killed, four employees of the hotel close to the airport also died. Arguably the most important result of the accident was that it created doubt about the integrity of the aircraft and its future. After all, Concorde had entered commercial service 25 years earlier, used 1950s and 60s technology, had a limited range mostly to the east coast of the United States and required an immense amount of increasingly expensive fuel.

I have had a strange fascination with aircraft crashes ever since a Turkish Air DC10 crashed outside Paris in early 1974. I had known someone on that flight. She had been booked on a British European Airways flight to London that was cancelled due to a strike. Since the Turkish plane was usually pretty empty for its last sector, most of the BEA passengers were transferred on to the DC10. The aft cargo door had been badly designed and then badly closed by a ground handler in Paris. As the aircraft pressurised, the door was blown open, the floor of the passenger cabin collapsed and severed hydraulic lines. It crashed into a wood with the loss of 346 lives.

Thereafter there was the dreadful series of errors that led to the collision of two 747s at Tenerife, the loss of a DC10 just after take-off at O’Hare when the left engine flew off, the Japan Airlines 747 which crashed into the woods following the aft bulkhead being blown out and taking the tail with it – the result of faulty maintenance 7 years earlier. 

But the crash the whole world remembers is surely that of the Air France Concorde. Although I only had one Concorde flight, I loved the entire experience. That and the AF crash have remained in my mind, the more so when I believe, as others appear to do, that the official French Accident Report contained major flaws, intent on ensuring as little blame as possible fell on then government-owned AF.

Within minutes the crash became the subject of intense speculation. Even today, there remain several important unanswered questions. But let me start with a brief description of events. I apologise for the length but it is really not possible to explain even some of what happened without going into considerable detail.

Background

AF4590 had been chartered by a German tour company. The mostly German passengers would first fly to Paris where they would transfer to the Concorde lounge prior to a flight to New York. Once there they would be taken in coaches to a cruise terminal where they were to join a long cruise to the Caribbean and beyond starting that evening.

The incoming flight from Dusseldorf was about 30 minutes late. Although this was not in itself an issue, any further major delay might create a problem in New York where their cruise liner had a specific departure time. But a last-minute technical fault was discovered on Concorde which had to be fixed. That resulted in yet another 30 – 40 minute delay. After the luggage and the passengers were on board, the aircraft taxied to the take-off runway. The captain started the take-off roll at 4:42pm local time. At some point roughly two thirds down the runway, air traffic control noticed heavy flames coming from the left side of the aircraft close to the No. 1 and No. 2 engines. Immediately the controller alerted the flight crew. They were then faced with two possibilities.

The first was to abort take-off. But since the aircraft had already passed V1 - the point at which there would be no more runway left for a safe abort – the captain had no choice but to get the aircraft into the air. As was discovered by the official BEA Report, had take-off been aborted, it would have crashed through the end of the runway at approx. 78 knots. Given the fire at the back of the plane and all its 17 fuel tanks brimming with fuel, the resultant fireball would have killed everyone.

The second was to get into the air and then find a way of getting back to a runway with emergency services as quickly as possible. As footage taken from the cabin of a truck passing near the airport shows, the Concorde never climbed higher than 60 meters. The pilots discussed going around to land back at Charles de Gaulle. ”No time” said the captain. They decided to try and land at the nearby Le Bourget airport. Within seconds, the same “no time” was repeated. Seconds later the aircraft became unflyable, pitched up and banked heavily to the left. It crashed into a nearby hotel.

Photo:BEA/IGN/Fleximage

The Official French Accident Report

According to the January 2002 Report by the French Accident Investigation Bureau (BEA), the crash had a single cause. Concorde ran over a narrow strip of metal as it was about half way down the runway. This shredded the first inner tyre of the left-side undercarriage (each side had four wheels – two in front and two behind). A section of rubber was hurled at massive speed towards one of the 17 fuel tanks mounted in Concorde’s wings. These had been fuelled to the brim on the captain’s orders instead of, as was normal practice, leaving some air in each tank. The rubber did not puncture tank No. 5, but it set off a hydrodynamic surge inside that resulted in a shockwave and extreme pressure on the walls of the tank. With no air to absorb the shock, very quickly the fuel ruptured the tank outwards at its weakest point. The fuel quickly ignited.

Concorde Fuel Tank Layout: BEA Report

As a result, Engine No. 2 suffered an engine surge which reduced its efficiency. Around the same time, a similar surge resulted in a loss of efficiency in Engine No. 1. This required the captain to compensate for a leftwards droop. However, both engines quickly recovered, only for No. 2 to suffer a second surge during take off. Engines 3 and 4 operated normally. At the same time, the crew was unable to reduce drag when they could not retract the landing gear. Thus the aircraft suffered from insufficient power and a leftward yaw.

The Metal Strip

After investigating flights which had taken off prior to the Concorde, it was discovered that the strip came from a part of the engine cowling of a DC10 belonging to Continental Airlines. This had been replaced during a regular service in Houston on 9 July. But the mechanic had not replaced it with the part as specified in the maintenance manual. This required a steel strip to be affixed by a series of screws. Instead, the mechanic used a strip made mostly of titanium. Since the screw holes did not match, he drilled new holes. To further ensure the integrity of the new part, he glued it with a red glue prior to inserting the screws. It was this red glue on the strip found on the Paris runway that identified it as having come from the Continental flight. Over the next two weeks, the strip began to come loose, finally dropping off as the DC10 took-off from Paris.

Alternative Theories

I recall seeing a television documentary maybe two years or so after the crash which brought out a series of other causes which are either not included in the BEA Report or are dismissed as not material. I cannot find that particular video. But most of its conclusions were included in an investigation by The Observer newspaper and reported on 13 May 2001. It is important to realise that this news Report takes into account the views of seven Concorde pilots, six from BA and 1 from Air France, and one AF engineer, all with vast experience in flying the plane. One, John Hutchinson, had been piloting Concorde for 15 years. Their views are therefore more than important in trying to find the reasons for the crash. (I call this group the Expert Panel - EP). 

Delay in Departure

Because the incoming flight from Dusseldorf had been delayed and the technical problem on the Concorde then had to be fixed, it was around 90 minutes behind schedule. Had it taken off even 10 minutes earlier, that Continental DC10 would likely still be at its gate and there would be no metal strip on the runway.

Weight of the Aircraft

The Observer EP agreed – as does the BEA Report – that the Concorde was overweight. 19 bags of luggage weighing 500 kgs had been added at the last minute and were not on the manifest that had been given to the cockpit crew. Although the baggage crew did not wish to load them, the captain ordered them to do so. With no room in the forward hold, they were crammed into the back hold. Earlier the captain had asked for extra fuel to be added beyond the usual limit for New York flights. Thus, this Concorde ended up six tonnes overweight. Flying just a tonne over maximum structural weight was theoretically illegal. With the addition of so much weight at the back, the plane’s centre of gravity had shifted “dangerously” towards the rear. The captain was pushing to the extreme the limits of safe flying as identified by the aircraft’s test pilots prior to the aircraft entering passenger service.

Weather 

Between the time of their flight briefing and positioning the aircraft at the end of the runway, there had been a change from virtually no wind to an eight-knot wind. Instead of facing this wind, the captain had the wind behind him. That was a crucial error and as Hutchinson says ”an incredible revelation”. The captain now needed even more runway before he could get his aircraft into the air. Many Concorde pilots had found themselves in a similar situation. On those occasions they had insisted on taxiing back to take off from the other end of the runway to be against the wind. “They were already at the limits of the envelope. Once the wind changed, they were beyond it,” says Hutchinson

Runway Inspection 

It was protocol at CFG airport for there always to be a full runway inspection prior to every Concorde departure. This was important because unlike conventional aircraft whose wing flaps and leading edge slats help to progressively reduce the weight of an aircraft as it speeds down the runway and the wings start to do their work, Concorde’s delta-shaped wings resulted in its extremely heavy weight remaining a constant until actually airborne. The stresses on its landing gear were therefore unusually severe. It was vital that any runway debris be cleared. Yet prior to the Concorde take-off roll on this afternoon, there had been no runway inspection. 

The Air France 747

As Concorde started its take-off roll, there was an AF Boeing 747 which had just arrived from Tokyo waiting on a taxi-way to the left of the runway and about three quarters of the way down. One of the passengers was the President of France returning from a G7 meeting. The pilots of the Concorde would have been well aware of this VVIP passenger. Also on that flight was a Japanese tourist who happened to have purchased an instant camera from a vending machine at the airport in Tokyo. The 747 captain had advised his passengers that a Concorde was about to take off. The Japanese had his camera at the ready. He had no idea his photo of Concorde taking off with a ball of fire behind it, would find its way on to the cover of many magazines around the world. Although lacking clarity, this photo shows that the source of the fire is not an engine but is located somewhere closer to the centre of the doomed aircraft.

Concorde was veering to the left and getting close to the grass at the side of the runway. The co-pilot is then heard shouting, “Watch out!” No explanation has ever been put forward for this exclamation. The EP team believes it was to remind the captain that on its present track Concorde would come dangerously close to that 747. Also, if even one of its wheels was to hit the grass, the undercarriage would have been ripped off, Concorde would have flipped over and almost certainly ended up engulfing both planes in a fireball. In fact, the Concorde was even closer to the 747 than anyone believed. As it took off way left, the 747 captain would later say it soared above his stationary plane by less than 30 feet. It should have been nowhere near the 747.

Another issue raised by the pilot of that 747 was his claim that there was smoke coming from the back of the Concorde before it reached the metal strip. This could have been a result of the wheels on the left undercarriage rubbing against each other. 

The Landing Gear Spacer

Both BA and AF had very strict regulations for their ground crews when any work on the Concorde was required. One regular maintenance requirement was the time when various load-bearing components would have to be replaced. Given the stresses on the undercarriage, the “spacers” were one such component. These keep the two sets of tyres on each side of the landing gear in place to ensure there is always a fixed space between them. They are only 5 inches in diameter and 12 inches long. When this Concorde had had certain parts replaced a week prior to the accident, the mechanics had failed to replace the spacer in the left undercarriage. The aircraft then flew twice to and from New York. Each time it took off and the landing gear retracted, without the spacer two of the left wheels got closer to the other two. By 25 July there had been movement of about seven inches. As a result the ten wheels in the full undercarriage were out of alignment. The spacer was later discovered in the Air France Concorde workshop.

As those on the EP claim, when Concorde started its take off roll it would have felt a little like a supermarket trolley with a slightly wobbly wheel. They further claim that the acceleration of the Concorde was slower than normal from the start as though something was holding the aircraft back. They suggest this was a result of friction from the undercarriage. Without that friction, they believe the plane should have taken off 1,694 meters from the start of the runway – before it had reached the metal strip.

Take Off

With the undercarriage out of alignment, it was inevitable that Concorde would veer to the left. The captain could only correct this to a certain extent by using the rudder. The EP believe that as this was happening, it hit a landing light. It adds this was rather like trying to take off in an exceptionally heavy cross-wind, a situation all Concorde pilots were trained to avoid at all costs.

Should the captain have aborted take-off before reaching V1 to have this leftward movement checked? Almost certainly, yes. But he would have been aware of the resultant long delay and the relatively tight deadline for the passengers on arriving in New York. Might this have persuaded him that an abort was out of the question? We do not and cannot know. 

The BEA Report rejects this theory, suggesting instead that the leftward movement was a result of the failure of the engine, even though it accepts that the wheels were out of alignment.

The EP then suggests that with the aircraft beyond V1 and veering very close to the grass on the left, the captain had no choice but to take off, even though he will have known he was well below the required 220-knot airspeed.

Good Engine Shut Down after Take-off

Having been told about the fire and as the aircraft had just left the ground, the two right engines were working as normal, the left side No. 2 was occasionally surging and the No. 1 also subject to surging. The flight engineer then inexplicably shut down the No. 2 engine. All experts agree this was a “disastrous mistake”. Only the captain can order an engine shut down. The engine was not on fire and standard engine fire procedures further mandated no engine should be shut down below 400 feet. As John Hutchinson says, “Discipline had broken down. The captain doesn’t know what’s happening; the co-pilot doesn’t know; it's a shambles. Once you deviate from procedures, it’s chaos.”

Law Suits

While acknowledging some of the above, the Final BEA Report all but dismissed them and placed the entire blame on Continental Airlines. This was perhaps inevitable. Air France and its insurers were facing a huge compensation bill. It had already offered each victim US$1 million. If their lawyers were to proceed with an action in New York, as was their right, this would be peanuts. Air France was initially successful in 2010 when a French Court ruled that Continental had been wholly responsible for manslaughter in respect of the crash. Continental was ordered to pay 70% of the damages to victims. But two years later a French Appeals Court overruled that judgement. Instead it ordered Continental to make a payment of around one million Euros to AF as civil damages.

Conclusion 

John Hutchison believes the fire on its own should have been “eminently survivable: the pilot should have been able to fly himself out of trouble” as the fuel from that one tank would eventually have burned itself out. But the captain had broken rules one more time by giving an instruction to the engineer prior to take off to open Tank 11 by the tail so that it fed into Tank 5. This would ensure a constant supply of fuel to Tank 5 and help move the centre of gravity forward. But the effect was to make it impossible for him to fly himself out of trouble. Hutchinson believes the crash that resulted was a lethal combination of operational errors mostly by the cockpit crew and ‘negligence’ by the maintenance department of AF. 

'Discipline had broken down, “says Hutchinson. Chillingly, he adds, “Most of the contributing factors were avoidable.”

Sources

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/may/13/davidrose.focus

BEA Accident Report - https://www.bea.aero/uploads/tx_elydbrapports/f-sc000725a.pdf

 

Later TV Documentary by Captain Hutchinson

About 15 years or so after the EP Report, this video was made of John Hutchinson in the captain’s seat of a Concorde. He explains in greater detail and with additional information, particularly about the Concorde being overweight, the distribution of the weight and the state of the runway. It is very clear from what he says that the AF captain, AF ground crew and AF maintenance were very much the primary causes of the accident.

 

 

[NIrishGuy]

Just for the record and to appease any other members who may be wondering why this post is here - can you please clarify were there any "Gays"  on the flight( apart from the cabin crew of course)- just so it makes the subject a little more relevant to the Board perhaps !? :-)

[msclelovr]

Very interesting report @Peter. I knew about the metal on the runway but I did not know about the pilot errors. 
 

I flew often on Concorde as I was a monthly transatlantic commuter for 3 years. I really enjoyed being on the aircraft.

As an aside, I’ve been wary of AF pilots for some years. This report just reinforces my wariness. It originated with my learning of the numerous pilot errors that caused the AF flight from Rio to Paris to crash in 2009 (killing all 228 passengers and crew). 

[JKane]

This is a great writeup and very interesting.  I also follow aircraft incidents closely but had bought into the AF's narrative it was entirely the fault of the metal strip.  

 

[PeterRS]

9 hours ago, NIrishGuy said:

Just for the record and to appease any other members who may be wondering why this post is here - can you please clarify were there any "Gays"  on the flight( apart from the cabin crew of course)- just so it makes the subject a little more relevant to the Board perhaps !? :-)

I reckon your guess is as good as mine. So I will not guess. But perhaps it might be timely to repeat the Beer Bar sub-head - "Open to general topics not covered elsewhere including Current Events, Politics, Religion, Movies and other topics. Discuss the topic, not the policy or personality. Have fun and enjoy!"

As with quite an number of topics in the Beer Bar, there seems to be no requirement for any gay content.

[vinapu]

18 minutes ago, PeterRS said:

As with quite an number of topics in the Beer Bar, there seems to be no requirement for any gay content.

being gay poster satisfies that requirement

[PeterRS]

10 hours ago, msclelovr said:

Very interesting report @Peter. I knew about the metal on the runway but I did not know about the pilot errors. 

Thank you. What makes this crash even more sad is that almost the same situation had occurred years earlier - and nothing had been done about it. An Air France Concorde was departing Dulles Airport in Washington on 14 June 1979. On the take-off roll two of its tyres burst. Part of the rubber actually pierced the wing and left a hole through the entire wing structure. Fuel leaked out. An airline pilot who happened to be sitting close to the point where the hole occurred drew the crew's attention to it. At first the response was, we're continuing to Paris! Only when the co-pilot actually came out of the cockpit to look at the damage did the captain reduce thrust and land back at Dulles. I do not know the cause of the tyre burst, but it would surely have reasonable to assume that the two Concorde operators might thereafter have at least considered fitting a more robust tyre.

As another regular poster has frequently pointed out, Air France would not be his airline of choice. In addition to the Rio/Paris disaster, there was the August 2005 crash of an Airbus A340 on landing at Toronto. The aircraft overshot the runway and dropped into a ravine. Merciafully there were no fatalities but the A340 was totally destroyed by fire. The official Report put the blame on the pilots.

[a-447]

Then there's the case of the Air France demonstration flight at an air show where the plane took off and crashed into the forest at the end of the runway.

[PeterRS]

23 minutes ago, a-447 said:

Then there's the case of the Air France demonstration flight at an air show where the plane took off and crashed into the forest at the end of the runway.

Astonishingly, although the aircraft was flying low to the ground to demonstrate its agility, it was carrying 136 passengers and crew, 3 of whom died. It was supposed to fly at 100 ft. above the runway with undercarriage down. In fact, reports say it was only at 30 ft. and then could not climb fast enough to avoid the trees. The official BEA Report is also controversial as it maintained flying at 30 ft off the ground was not a deliberate action of the pilot. However, he was found guilty along with others and sentenced to 10 months in prison. There were also reports that the flight recorder might have been tampered with and 4 seconds cut from the tape. 

This reminds me of a Cathay Pacific 777 pilot who was fired 3 years ago. He was at Boeing's Paine Field to pick up a new 777ER and fly it to Hong Kong. On board were 60 VIPs  including Cathay Pacific's Chairman. Apparently it is not uncommon for pilots picking up new aircraft to buzz the ground after departure as a way of saying goodbye to the airport staff. This pilot did the stunt at only 30 feet off the ground without the undercarriage down. Such flybys require approval from the airline and air traffic control. It is believed  neither had been obtained. Looking at this short, vdo, I'm not sure I would like to have been on that plane!

 

[NIrishGuy]

6 hours ago, PeterRS said:

As with quite an number of topics in the Beer Bar, there seems to be no requirement for any gay content.

Just to clarify my post was a joke based on that "why are non gay things posted on this board" post by someone else in another thread. I enjoyed reading your post and found it interesting - imagine that, a "gay" being able to find something interesting that didn't mean Asian cocks, who'd of believed it eh ! :-)

[reader]

The crash at Tenerife was both horrible and unique in that involved no mechanical failure of either of the two 747's. They collided on the same runway (headed in opposite directions) due to series of communications snafus and heavy fog. One had just barely got airborne but too late to escape ripping off the fuselage of the other aircraft trying to turn away at the last moment. Here's a brief dramatization of those final minutes that took the lives of 583.

 

[PeterRS]

2 hours ago, reader said:

The crash at Tenerife was both horrible and unique in that involved no mechanical failure of either of the two 747's

It was indeed a horrible accident that, like the Concorde crash, did not need to happen. To give a bit more of the background than on that short video, most of the planes at Tenerife airport that afternoon were not supposed to be there. Their destination had been Gran Canaria about 100 kms away. But a terrorist bomb had gone off at Gran Canaria airport around 1:00 pm. As a result, the airport was closed. The nearest airport was Tenerife, a much smaller airport cut out of a hillside that was not really equipped to handle 747 aircraft but the runway was just long enough for them to land and take off. So most of the aircraft destined for Gran Canaria were diverted there. These included five wide body aircraft including the Pan Am and KLM 747s.

Apart from its runway, Tenerife had just one taxiway from the Terminal with 4 linking off ramps from the main runway. With limited parking facilities, Tenerife's apron quickly became saturated and could take no more aircraft. Pan Am had arrived first. KLM a little later. The KLM 747 was parked behind the Pan Am aircraft. So Pan Am could only move once the KLM flight had moved away from its position. As the delay got longer and longer, many passengers and aircraft crew became visibly pissed off. Then cloud started coming down from the hill in front of the airport, basically ensuring no aircraft could take off until it at least partially cleared.

Not to scale map of Tenerife airport from wikipedia with the crash point marked with the red star

Once Gran Canaria had reopened, the Tenerife controllers tried to get the delayed planes away as quickly as possible. But the airport had no ground radar. Worse, the pilots had no experience of the airport. Pan Am was all set to go, but was stuck behind the KLM 747 whose captain had decided to save time at Gran Canaria by refuelling at Tenerife. So Pan Am had to wait an extra 30 minutes before the refuelling truck was out of the way and KLM ready to taxi to the end of the runway. With part of the taxiway also blocked, KLM had to use the main runway for taxing before turning at the end and standing by. Just before then, Pan Am was also given instructions to taxi on the main runway and then turn off at Exit No. 3. To be certain, they asked the controller for confirmation, He very clearly said "number three - one, two three." By a stroke of terrible luck, there was still fog, the runway exits were not marked and the Pan Am crew became disorientated. They passed Exits 1 and 2 but then seemed to become confused. They missed Exit 3 and so continued taxiing expecting to find it quickly.

Because of the lack of ground radar, air traffic control had little idea where the 747s were. Juggling so many aircraft, the controller also seemed to become unsure of his instructions. Once at the end of the runway and ready to take off, the highly experienced KLM captain said he was ready for take off. The controller confirmed this and his message included "stand by, I will call you." But due to bad maintenance of the radio equipment, part of the full message was garbled. The controller then instructed Pan Am to report when he was clear of the runway. The KLM flight crew heard this exchange but interpreted it to mean that Pan Am was already clear of the runway. So the KLM captain, despite some concerns raised by his co-pilot, decided to take off. As is shown in the vdo, Pan Am had only just reached Exit 4. Seeing the KLM plane bearing down on them out of the fog, the crew added full throttle. But this takes about six seconds to have an effect. Even though the KLM captain attempted to take off well before he had reached his scheduled take off speed, the two 747s inevitably collided.

The Accident Report found that the primary cause was the KLM captain taking off without formal clearance. It was suggested that he was extremely anxious to do so because of new maximum duty hours recently put in place by KLM. He was afraid his crew and the aircraft might end up being stuck at Gran Canaria overnight. Other factors played into the accident including the fog, the extra delay caused by the KLM captain's decision to refuel at Tenerife to save time and incorrect communications to and from air traffic control. As Captain Hutchinson says in the Concorde vdo, most aircraft accidents result from a combination fo circumstances. This was certainly true with what is still the world's deadliest passenger aircraft accident.

[vinapu]

considering I'm flying off overseas tonight ( regretfully not to Thailand ) all those true stories are keeping my spirit up before taking off, he , he.

 

[PeterRS]

10 hours ago, vinapu said:

considering I'm flying off overseas tonight ( regretfully not to Thailand ) all those true stories are keeping my spirit up before taking off, he , he.

Happy landings - the proper ones!!

Many years ago, being aware that in aircraft accidents involving fire a majority of victims die from smoke inhalation before they can get to the exits, I did some research and found a company which specialised in manufacturing proper smoke hoods. These provided up to 15 minutes of breathable air, time enough to escape from a burning plane. The equipment was called Evac-U-8 manufactured by a Canadian company.

So I purchased two, one for my apartment and one for flying. They were cylindrical, about the size of an old Coca Cola can. Slightly bulky but I felt they could save my life if ever I found myself in a fire. When I stupidly left one on a plane, I purchased another. They did make me feel safer and fortunately I did not have to use one. In fact, I was doubly fortunate. After I had been carrying one around for about 5 years, the product was found to have a defect and recalled. Refunds were promised but the manufacturer went bust. At one time there was a discussion somewhere about the desire for all passenger aircraft to have smoke hoods in every seat. This was ditched due to cost.

[Guest]

Thanks to OP PeterRS for this thread - very interesting.  Vaguely remember some of these stories and was fascinating to get the details & videos.  Aviation history always seems to lure me in 

[NIrishGuy]

13 hours ago, vinapu said:

considering I'm flying off overseas tonight ( regretfully not to Thailand ) all those true stories are keeping my spirit up before taking off, he , he.

 

Likewise...I'm literally walking out the door to the airport to head for a flight to Gibraltar and just realised that perhaps this isn't the best thread to be reading just now :-)

 

[PeterRS]

10 minutes ago, NIrishGuy said:

Likewise...I'm literally walking out the door to the airport to head for a flight to Gibraltar and just realised that perhaps this isn't the best thread to be reading just now :-)

 

Perhaps a cheap, trashy Barbara Cartland romance novel will help while away your time and dispel any fears. "The Wings of Ecstacy" sounds ideal LOL

[msclelovr]

Don’t worry @NIrishGuy: statistically the most dangerous part of your journey is driving to the airport 

[msclelovr]

@PeterRS you’re putting too much emphasis on the tyres of Concorde. You’re also neglecting to mention the Concorde accident of 1989 that occurred in Sydney, Australia.

A chartered BA Concorde was (IIRC) coming from New Zealand and flying into Sydney. On coming over the city, the upper part of the rudder broke off and sheared through the tail in one direction. If the metal had gone in the other direction, it would have severed the fuel lines and the aircraft would have become unflyable. It was extraordinary luck that a catastrophic accident was averted. As it was, the damage was only noticed once the Concorde had landed safely and was on the ground. 
 

As I flew a lot in those years, I got to know quite a few British Airways personnel. One time, a BA engineer happily chatted to me and detailed how the Concorde was checked every month. I can’t speak for the AF aircraft but BA checked its Concordes by stripping the aircraft completely down to the paintwork and inspecting for minute cracks. Of course, so few were built that eventually one (that BA had donated to a museum) had to be cannibalised for spare parts.

[PeterRS]

19 minutes ago, msclelovr said:

@PeterRS you’re putting too much emphasis on the tyres of Concorde. You’re also neglecting to mention the Concorde accident of 1989 that occurred in Sydney, Australia.

A chartered BA Concorde was (IIRC) coming from New Zealand and flying into Sydney. On coming over the city, the upper part of the rudder broke off and sheared through the tail in one direction. If the metal had gone in the other direction, it would have severed the fuel lines and the aircraft would have become unflyable. It was extraordinary luck that a catastrophic accident was averted. As it was, the damage was only noticed once the Concorde had landed safely and was on the ground. 

I have no idea what you mean about my having put too much emphasis on the tyres. That information is provided in the Experts Report that I mention in the OP, it is included in Captain Hutchison's comments on the attached video and is further included in the official BEA Report. The tyre shredding was a vital reason for that particular crash. May I direct you to page 93 of the BEA Report (as linked in the OP) which points out that prior to the 2000 crash, there had been no less than 57 incidents involving Concorde tyre bursts - 30 on Air France aircraft and 27 on BA aircraft. Twelve of these bursts had resulted in "structural consequences on the wings and/or the tanks, of which six led to penetration of the tanks." A further 21 incidents were noted. Despite all this, neither airline had decided to change the type of tyres used on Concorde. This only occurred after the 2000 crash when stronger tyres less capable of shredding were designed and added.

I am well aware of the Sydney incident.  Exactly the same was to occur 3 years later on BA001 en route to New York on 19 March 1992. Below are photos of the structural damage to both from which it is easy to see that the breakage was to the upper rudders and virtually identical on both flights - 

1989 Photo at Sydney airport after charter flight from Christchurch following in flight loss of rudder part

1992 Photo of BA001 on arrival in New York following in flight loss of rudder part

Rudder failure or breakage played zero part in the 2000 AF crash. The important point here I suggest is that neither one of the above two rudder incidents involved loss of life. Even after the parts broke off, the flights carried on as normal with the crew unaware of what had happened and both landed safely at their destinations. We remember the 2000 crash simply because it caused a total loss of life and total destruction of the aircraft.

With all respect, nothing that I have read indicates that either 'breakage' could have led to severing of fuel lines. As noted in the fuel tank locations in the OP, there is only one small fuel tank at the back of the aircraft - Tank #11. The Sydney bound aircraft was not over Sydney when the breakage occurred. Both accident reports make it clear the aircraft were in fact travelling over sea at supersonic speed when the rudder parts broke off. At that speed it would have been impossible for the broken parts to drop down and tear open the aft of the aircraft's structure. The parts themselves had a honeycomb structure and were relatively light in weight. The massive speed of the wind flowing off the wings would unquestionably have propelled them backwards at very considerable velocity. This from the NZ/Sydney accident report - 

"failure had been limited to the upper part of the rudder which is constructed from skin panels bonded to a honeycomb core."

But I think the surprising issue in your post is that both rudder accidents were on BA aircraft. Whatever repairs BA made after the Tasman Sea incident were not sufficient to stop the same fault occurring a second time. Mercifully neither involved damage to a structurally essential part of the aircraft for the upper and lower rudders could operate independently if absolutely necessary.

[a-447]

1 hour ago, msclelovr said:

I can’t speak for the AF aircraft but BA checked its Concordes by stripping the aircraft completely down to the paintwork and inspecting for minute cracks. 

That is common procedure for all commercial airliners.

It's called the D check and is carried out every 6 ~10 years, depending on the aircraft type.

[msclelovr]

26 minutes ago, a-447 said:

That is common procedure for all commercial airliners.

It's called the D check and is carried out every 6 ~10 years, depending on the aircraft type.

I agree @a-447 but my point was that BA did it monthly on Concorde

[msclelovr]

Please don’t take offence @PeterRS. I’m not disputing what you wrote, and I’m certainly not disputing the causes identified in expert reports. I apologise if you feel slighted - it was not my intention. 

My comment was intended to highlight the emphasis on tyres and debris on runways - a problem common to all aircraft.
 

I mentioned Sydney & Concorde because it is an example of disaster luckily averted. Maybe my understanding is wrong but I cited what a senior manager (in Engineering) at BA told me in confidence at the time, that if the part of the rudder has sheared off in the other direction it would have cut through the lines on that side and the aircraft would have been unflyable (and crashing into the Sydney urban area with great loss of life). 

[PeterRS]

2 hours ago, msclelovr said:

Please don’t take offence @PeterRS. I’m not disputing what you wrote, and I’m certainly not disputing the causes identified in expert reports. I apologise if you feel slighted - it was not my intention. 

My comment was intended to highlight the emphasis on tyres and debris on runways - a problem common to all aircraft.
 

I mentioned Sydney & Concorde because it is an example of disaster luckily averted. Maybe my understanding is wrong but I cited what a senior manager (in Engineering) at BA told me in confidence at the time, that if the part of the rudder has sheared off in the other direction it would have cut through the lines on that side and the aircraft would have been unflyable (and crashing into the Sydney urban area with great loss of life). 

No offence taken at all. I merely failed to make the link between the 2000 crash and the Sydney incident.

I am sure the advice you were given was correct had the aircraft been flying at a much slower speed and was perhaps banking. I have no expert backing for my view about the upper part of the rudder shearing off at high velocity behind the aircraft. As it was at supersonic speed when it happened, I merely cannot see how the broken section could possibly have flown off in a downwards direction.

But your comment about your source reminded me that when it comes to accidents, even experts have not only differing views but sometimes wrong views. It brings to mind another fatal crash - yes, I can hear groans from some readers, sorry. Some will certainly remember the Soviet Union's shooting down of KAL007 on 1 September 1983 as it was approaching Japanese air space on a flight to Seoul from New York and Anchorage. This was a bizarre series of events about which there were many theories, even after the end of the Soviet Union when the Russian files were finally opened up for inspection by western experts.

Soon after the crash, I was having drinks in one of my usual watering holes after work the Dickens Bar in Hong Kong's Excelsior Hotel. My friend and I were sitting at the bar when two others sat down beside us. It turned out they were pilots of South African Airways. Their conversation soon turned to KAL007. To encapsulate their comments, they said they were certain the Korean 747 must have been on a spying mission. That was certainly one of the theories floating around at the time, although in the years since then that has been superseded by one suggesting that the pilot made an obvious mistake after he left Anchorage by wrongly programming the computer. This error led to the aircraft progressively taking a course far to the west of the one on his flight plan. As a result he steered the aircraft first over the Soviet's Kamchatka Peninsula, re-entered international airspace before returning over Soviet Airspace above Sakhalin Island. 

By this time KAL007 had inexplicably deviated 300 miles off course as is shown on this map. The lower of the two routes has the identification beacons to help with navigation -

In 1983 the Cold War was at its height. The Soviet Union was in crisis. Yuri Andropov had taken over on the death of Brezhnev the previous year. But Andropov himself was not in good health. In February he suffered total kidney failure. The country was mired in a war in Afghanistan which Andropov had opposed. The Soviet economy was in disastrous stagnation. The military was virtually the only part of the economy that the west believed might be on a par with its own. In America, President Reagan had recently dubbed the Soviet Union "an evil empire". He had also announced the start of the USA's "Star Wars" programme which would provide additional protection from attack by Soviet missiles.

Meanwhile, the Soviet high command never believed a civilian airliner would overfly its airspace. So when KAL007 appeared on the radar there was chaos. They had no idea what to do. Eventually, with KAL007 about to leave airspace over the Kamchatka Peninsula, fighters were sent up to intercept it. But they were too late. As the 747 approached Sakhallin, however, they were on alert and two fighter jets were scrambled to approach it. Soon they were trailing the 747 about 4 miles to its rear. With its bulbous front, the 747 is a very distinctive aircraft. The fighter pilots could have identified it. On the other hand, being a night flight, all the window shades were probably down. It could, for all they knew, have been a cargo plane or one adapted for military use. However, years after the Soviet Union had died, the captain of one fighter jet claimed to be aware that there were two decks with windows on the KAL plane and that such an aircraft adapted for military use would have very few windows. They knew it was a passenger aircraft. 

One fighter pilot fired warning shots ahead of the Korean plane. Those in the cockpit, unaware of their position, clearly did not see or hear them. In fact they had just had clearance from air traffic control in Japan to ascend from 33,000 ft to 35,000 ft. When the 747 did not descend, there was more chaos in the Soviets air defence headquarters. They took the ascent to mean the 747 was taking avoiding action. With time running out, the fighter pilot fired two missiles. One exploded close to the 747. As was later discovered after the Russians released a great deal of information about the crash in 1992, the missile did not hit the 747. It exploded near the rear. Three of the four hydraulic cables were severed but the outer skin was not punctured, there was no loss of cabin pressure and the four engines continued to function. Indeed, the 747 continued flying for 12 whole minutes before the pilots lost all control and the aircraft spiralled to the ocean. It must have been the most horrific way to die. Making matters worse for the Koreans, Russian ships were first on the scene. Over months they reclaimed some of the wreckage including the black boxes. They refused to reveal this knowledge until 1992.

I don't know enough to give much more information. Two things are clear, though. KAL007 was having difficulty communicating with Anchorage after the aircraft had reached its cruising altitude. So it had help from another KAL aircraft which was flying close behind on the same route. For whatever reason, it had no problem with flying on the scheduled flight plan route. But there was a third plane also very close by. This was one of America's spy planes, a Boeing RC-135, the military version of the 707. This was flying figure-of-eight patterns very close to KAL007. Coincidentally one of its '8s' coincided with the arrival of KAL007 in Soviet airspace. Could the fighter jets controllers have confused the two aircraft? It was known the USA wanted to find out what new air defence systems the Soviets might have been installed on Kamchatka and Sakhalin. It was also believed that there had secretly been a major missile installation much further inland but they did not know where. Could the USA military have created the deviation of KAL007 into Soviet airspace so as to lead to activation of alarm systems on that installation so providing the USA with a precise location? They would surely have assumed - erroneously - that the Soviets would not shoot down a civilian airliner.

Other "whys?" soon emerged. Why did the Soviets first identify KAL007 as a military target? Why did KAL007 commence a climb to 35,000 ft. after the fighter jets warning shots? Why were no bodies ever found? What happened to them? It was known that one very right-wing conservative Congressman had been a passenger. But the Soviets claimed that no bodies were recovered. Equally the actions of both the USA and the Soviet Union immediately after the crash still need explanation. Without sufficient time even for a briefing on the crash, Reagan was on the airwaves calling it a "massacre" and a "crime against humanity." What did he know, how did he know it and when did he know it? Why, six hours after the crash, did the Korean authorities announce that the flight had landed safely on Sakhalin, as was quickly announced in print in The New York Times, thereby contradicting the President?

Almost all this is speculation. KAL007 remains one of the greatest mysteries of the Cold War. My South African Airways pilots were 100% convinced KAL007 had been rigged for a spying mission. They believed there could be no other possible reason. After the Russians released their files, it became more clear that there had definitely been a problem with the 747's onboard computer and how it had been set. Whatever the truth, it plunged the world into a level of tension not been seen since the Cuban missile crisis.

[PeterRS]

Spurred on by a couple of questions from readers, I’ll add what little more I know/speculate about the mystery of KAL007. Even with files being opened up after the Cold War, it still remains the stuff of conspiracy theories with many many issues, most crucial, still unsolved. Here are just a few.

1. Prior to the downing of the 747, there had been five documented cases of incursion by non-Soviet aircraft into Soviet airspace since the first in 1952. Perhaps ironically the last of these incidents also involved Korean Airlines when a flight intruded into Soviet airspace above a restricted military area south of Murmansk. The Korean plane was shot down but was able to land with two just deaths. Surprisingly there was almost no adverse international reaction. Indeed, the president of South Korea thanked the Soviet Union for the speedy return of the surviving passengers and crew.

As a result, international norms suggested the prohibiting of shooting an intruding aircraft just because it was in one’s airspace. In other words, “exclusive sovereignty” was no excuse. But in November 1982, the Soviet Union enacted a law authorising the Soviet Air Defence Forces to use armed force “against violators of the USSR state border”, whether they threaten violence or not. The USA disagreed with this law claiming that mere suspicion about intent does not justify military action.

2. Why was the Anchorage VOR beacon (very high frequency omni-directional beacon) providing location information to aircraft and enabling it to keep on course out of action when KAL007 took off? This provides information for up to 200 miles distance. Such equipment requires annual maintenance. Allegedly it was being maintained on that night. Might that have been deliberate?

3. Why did the USA have its RC-135 Surveillance aircraft flying very near an off-course passenger airliner heading for Soviet airspace? At one point they were so close that their radio images merged for ten minutes.

4. Why did the captain of KAL007 radio Tokyo flight control centre “We have safely passed over southern Kamchatka. The plane is proceeding normally”?  The words “safely over” are deeply suspicious. This recording allegedly proves that the captain knew perfectly well he had flown over Soviet airspace.

5. US and subsequently Japanese air traffic controllers were responsible for the flight of KAL007. Why did neither group of controllers even once attempt to warn the plane that it was not just off course, but massively off course?

6.  Following the crash, the USA and Japan disclosed tape recordings of the radio transmissions of the Soviet fighter pilots. Thus both were perfectly well aware of KAL007’s perilous position. Yet again neither communicated any concern to the doomed plane.

7.  While denying that KAL007 was on a spying mission, the USA conceded that it had violated Soviet airspace.

8.  When the US Ambassador to the UN disputed the Soviet’s account, her presentation relied heavily on the recordings of radio conversations between the Soviet fighter pilots and their three ground control stations. These covered the last 30 minutes of KAL007’s flight. The Soviet Ambassador did not dispute these, although later Soviet commentators claimed they had been falsified. Yet despite this knowledge about the plane’s location, Ambassador Kirkpatrick never explained the lack of warning to the airline or its pilots.

9. The Report made public on 30 December 1983 by the technical experts of ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation) came to the conclusion that the route deviation was a result of pilot error re an incorrect computer input after leaving Anchorage. Strangely, and controversially, it concluded that civilian air traffic controllers could not have known about its major deviation and that military authorities who might have detected the deviation were not responsible for it

https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1477&context=yjil

10. The last and most intriguing part of the mystery is that the world still does not know where the bodies and the remains of the aircraft are. Absolutely nothing was found. This is unlike any other aircraft lost over water – with the more recent exception of Malaysian Airlines flight MH370. The Soviets agreed that the location of the crash was Moneron Island. This is little more than 300 kms north of Hokkaido.  Japanese ships were reasonably quickly at the scene. How is it even remotely possible that not one tiny piece of debris, not one body nor even one body part has ever been found? It belies belief that the Soviets could have farmed up all the wreckage in such a short period of time. And the Soviets always denied they had recovered any bodies. Yet two months after the crash, their divers were able to locate the black boxes. They find the black boxes but not one tiny scrap of wreckage? Even a US Navy-led search of the area revealed absolutely nothing. True? Or deliberately false?

Relatives of the passengers and crew remained convinced for years that the only explanation is the aircraft must have landed intact somewhere on Soviet soil. Yet Soviet files opened years later revealed nothing. 

I agree with those South African pilots I met who believe KAL007 had to have been on a spying mission prompted by the US. But in the absence of so much detail, that can only be speculation. Curiouser and curiouser!